"Infinite are the arguments of mages."
We are, as a people, quite obsessed with what will happen to us after death. Many, if not most, of us need to believe that we are certain about what will happen to us when we die. Whether the 'afterlife' is a non-corporeal paradise called Heaven, or a futuristic utopia here on Earth, we seem desperate to want to ensure our continued survival in it.
Survival for the pragmatic atheist means technology that extends or revives one's life in the face of death. Two increasingly-popular approaches to death nullification are cryonics and the idea that one's consciousness could be uploaded to a computer. Ironically, embracing these technologies doesn't always come with a corresponding interest in studying consciousness to make sure that nothing would be missing when one's mind is uploaded to computer, or revived from cryogenic stasis. (sigh)
From a 5-dimensional viewpoint, I see several obstacles to successfully preserving/continuing the 'self' in these ways. These obstacles aren't necessarily consistent with each other, but in light of the model that's developing, I feel there is some potential benefit in attempting to work through them.
The first obstacle involves the very idea of 'self'. We have a very strong, persistent, subjective feeling of being an independent and self-contained 'self'. I'm not talking about a sense of identity that is defined by socially-contingent labels, but rather a sense of being separate from that which is around us. This sense of self exhibits a strong continuity that 1) defies physical damage or illness, and 2) (usually) reconciles contradictory information and personal actions in a way that doesn't damage itself. (If you are tempted to argue that the sense of self is an unimportant epiphenomenon, then I have to wonder what it is that you are arguing for preserving.)
If the sense of self is an epiphenomenon, then are we sure that we understand the primary phenomenon that gives rise to it? We don't (generally) feel as if any portion of our expression of self arises as a result of any non-local connection to others. We tend to assume that the locally-isolated brain is solely responsible for our feelings and actions as a 'self'. But what if our expression of self were entirely (or even partially) a function of our non-local connection to others? If I, as an isolated observer, can choose/create which outcome I experience, then is it not possible that I in some sense am a product/expression of similar choices made by others? What if the very heart of multiple-observer interactions tells us that we are creating each other in the same way that we 'create' our experience of coincidences? And the critical question for technological-survivalists... If this were true, what would happen to my 'self' when it is displaced in time to a point in the future where no one who knew me exists?
The thing that bugs me about the arguments for cryonics is that they tout the fact that "dynamic brain activity can be lost and regained without loss of personal identity." (q) (My emphasis.) However this argument doesn't recognize its own limitation... To date, we have only ever succeeded in reinserting a person back into the information/observer grid that contained enough information about the person to enable such a comparison. Without such a network of other observers who have information about me - who are perhaps creating their consistent experience of me - will the 'who' that wakes up in 200 years be the same? If the surviving/revived consciousness has a sense of self, who would know (and how) that it was exhibiting the same personality for the same reasons as it did before?
(I have previously expressed skepticism about technology that would interrupt our connection to this admittedly poorly-defined grid. When I begin to think about longer intervals of time, I am confronted with the idea that the information contained within the grid might change significantly or, if no information is lost, that its availability/accessibility has been altered in some way. Yeah, I know - that's too vague to be useful at this point.)
That a sense of self can arise from the appropriate re-electrolyzation of a brain is not the argument I'm attempting to have here. And I can't say what, if not the brain, is the substrate of consciousness, or how another observer would hold the information that enables them to influence my expression of self. I suspect much of the problem in defining/identifying these things has to do with our limiting perception of time. Time - specifically, accessing information from the future - is the next stop on this flash forward vision of technological survival.
And time is the one thing that I don't have more of right now, so I'll sign off.
Yours truly,
Rational, With Different Data
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Monday, January 11, 2010
The Substrate of Coincidence
"One cannot take truth by force, but perhaps indirectly, through phenomena, sign, and symbol we may approach her."
"In any case, jumping from one theory to another is an important part of the art of doing physics."
Yesterday I posed the questions - "And if a coincidence is not meaningful, why does it appear? Why should I experience any greater frequency of 'coincidences' than anyone else?" Today I'm going to add the question - What has changed about me that has caused/supported my ability to experience a higher frequency of 'coincidences' now than I did previously?
Confession time: I still foster/entertain competing models. I've previously mentioned that if external knowledge (knowledge about what is 'out there') does not represent something permanent/absolute, then it might ultimately prove to be problematic to create a model based on that knowledge. So I have two models right now that compete with each other to 'claim' new pieces of evidence/experience. The first model is brain-based, and reflects everything I've learned about contemporary neuroscience. The second model allows conscious experience to develop from/be anchored to something other than the brain. The nature of the thing that is 'other than the brain' changes to accomodate new information.
As I am essentially mapping my conscious experience into these models, it's possible that the second model would be of little use to anyone other than myself. The first model is what would generate excitement. And there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the brain is a perfectly adequate substrate for consciousness, although it remains to be seen how a materialistic model involving the brain would reconcile with the non-materialistic implications of the 5-dimensional model.
So what then is the substrate for experiencing coincidence? What triggers memories and fuses information together in a way that signals something important, and perhaps reflects information from the (subjective) future? Is there a wiring pattern within my brain that has changed over time to facilitate this type of experience? A chemical balance (or imbalance) that facilitates this type of perception?
The process of fusing all the clues together is messy. And it doesn't pay to go too long without reminding yourself of the big picture. A strictly subjective, introspective analysis of experience yields important pieces of information that demand explanation, but you must pay equal attention to the clues that have nothing to do with coincidence perception if you want to find a comprehensive model. For example, there is a period of a few seconds after I wake up in the morning where I have a sense of identity and I can recognize the familiarity of locational cues, but wherein I am unable to recall the day of the week or the date. This information invariably takes a few extra seconds to 'kick in'. Why should that happen? What do we know about the brain that supports an explanation for that experience? And why would a model of consciousness tethered to something other than the brain support such a phenomenon?
But I digress... Introspective analysis is wonderful if you want a model that works for you. Arguably, all that really matters is that you have a model that enables you to function as effectively as possible. However, science demands something that transfers beyond the experience of a single individual. And so begins the struggle to incorporate subjective experience into a larger model.
Assuming for a moment that the ability to experience 'coincidence' parallels other human abilities in that its expression can be plotted along a continuum, we can ask the question - What would that continuum look like? Rather than attempt to collapse the continuum of expression down to a simple dichotomy (such as skeptics/believers, crazy/sane), why not embrace a bit more of the collective human experience? Perhaps the continuum looks something like this...
(reading Low Expression --> High Expression)
Normal --> Highly lucky/unlucky --> Pathology/Inability to function
Let's assume that there is an optimal expression of 'experiencing coincidence'. Let's call it 'Magickal' just to mess with our physicist friends, and differentiate it from simple 'luck' by an element of control that can be exerted over the experiencing of coincidences. What can we learn about that category from the data available from the other categories on the continuum?
Baseline data --> Psychological data --> Psychological/Neurological data
What types of psycho/neuropathologies most closely correspond to an over-expression of 'experiencing coincidence'? Note that we're not asking about hallucinations. We're asking about two things that may contribute to pathology/inability to function with respect to experiencing coincidences. The first is simply the frequency of the experienced coincidences. The second - and possible the true source of the inability to function in society - is the beliefs that are held about the experienced coincidences. It's possible that a high frequency of experienced coincidences is tied to and/or fed by incorrect beliefs based on the experience of those coincidences. If given a better belief structure, would the experience of coincidence cease to result in a pathological condition? Or is the frequency of the experienced coincidences itself the crippling element? It's hard for me to know to what degree modern psychological treatments even attempt to separate the two.
Once we have identified the most appropriate pathologies for study, we can also ask - What can we discover about the underlying substrate of coincidence from neurochemical attempts to treat these pathologies?
We are far from a comprehensive understanding of the brain, and there are always the nagging placebo/nocebo effects demanding an explanation within a comprehensive model. The purpose of this post isn't to attempt to comprehensively answer any of these questions. Rather, this post is supposed to make you think about what I'm thinking about. :)
[Interesting Aside: In March you should see three articles targeting quantum paradigms of psychopathology being published in the online journal Neuroquantology. Could be interesting...]
"In any case, jumping from one theory to another is an important part of the art of doing physics."
Yesterday I posed the questions - "And if a coincidence is not meaningful, why does it appear? Why should I experience any greater frequency of 'coincidences' than anyone else?" Today I'm going to add the question - What has changed about me that has caused/supported my ability to experience a higher frequency of 'coincidences' now than I did previously?
Confession time: I still foster/entertain competing models. I've previously mentioned that if external knowledge (knowledge about what is 'out there') does not represent something permanent/absolute, then it might ultimately prove to be problematic to create a model based on that knowledge. So I have two models right now that compete with each other to 'claim' new pieces of evidence/experience. The first model is brain-based, and reflects everything I've learned about contemporary neuroscience. The second model allows conscious experience to develop from/be anchored to something other than the brain. The nature of the thing that is 'other than the brain' changes to accomodate new information.
As I am essentially mapping my conscious experience into these models, it's possible that the second model would be of little use to anyone other than myself. The first model is what would generate excitement. And there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the brain is a perfectly adequate substrate for consciousness, although it remains to be seen how a materialistic model involving the brain would reconcile with the non-materialistic implications of the 5-dimensional model.
So what then is the substrate for experiencing coincidence? What triggers memories and fuses information together in a way that signals something important, and perhaps reflects information from the (subjective) future? Is there a wiring pattern within my brain that has changed over time to facilitate this type of experience? A chemical balance (or imbalance) that facilitates this type of perception?
The process of fusing all the clues together is messy. And it doesn't pay to go too long without reminding yourself of the big picture. A strictly subjective, introspective analysis of experience yields important pieces of information that demand explanation, but you must pay equal attention to the clues that have nothing to do with coincidence perception if you want to find a comprehensive model. For example, there is a period of a few seconds after I wake up in the morning where I have a sense of identity and I can recognize the familiarity of locational cues, but wherein I am unable to recall the day of the week or the date. This information invariably takes a few extra seconds to 'kick in'. Why should that happen? What do we know about the brain that supports an explanation for that experience? And why would a model of consciousness tethered to something other than the brain support such a phenomenon?
But I digress... Introspective analysis is wonderful if you want a model that works for you. Arguably, all that really matters is that you have a model that enables you to function as effectively as possible. However, science demands something that transfers beyond the experience of a single individual. And so begins the struggle to incorporate subjective experience into a larger model.
Assuming for a moment that the ability to experience 'coincidence' parallels other human abilities in that its expression can be plotted along a continuum, we can ask the question - What would that continuum look like? Rather than attempt to collapse the continuum of expression down to a simple dichotomy (such as skeptics/believers, crazy/sane), why not embrace a bit more of the collective human experience? Perhaps the continuum looks something like this...
(reading Low Expression --> High Expression)
Normal --> Highly lucky/unlucky --> Pathology/Inability to function
Let's assume that there is an optimal expression of 'experiencing coincidence'. Let's call it 'Magickal' just to mess with our physicist friends, and differentiate it from simple 'luck' by an element of control that can be exerted over the experiencing of coincidences. What can we learn about that category from the data available from the other categories on the continuum?
Baseline data --> Psychological data --> Psychological/Neurological data
What types of psycho/neuropathologies most closely correspond to an over-expression of 'experiencing coincidence'? Note that we're not asking about hallucinations. We're asking about two things that may contribute to pathology/inability to function with respect to experiencing coincidences. The first is simply the frequency of the experienced coincidences. The second - and possible the true source of the inability to function in society - is the beliefs that are held about the experienced coincidences. It's possible that a high frequency of experienced coincidences is tied to and/or fed by incorrect beliefs based on the experience of those coincidences. If given a better belief structure, would the experience of coincidence cease to result in a pathological condition? Or is the frequency of the experienced coincidences itself the crippling element? It's hard for me to know to what degree modern psychological treatments even attempt to separate the two.
Once we have identified the most appropriate pathologies for study, we can also ask - What can we discover about the underlying substrate of coincidence from neurochemical attempts to treat these pathologies?
We are far from a comprehensive understanding of the brain, and there are always the nagging placebo/nocebo effects demanding an explanation within a comprehensive model. The purpose of this post isn't to attempt to comprehensively answer any of these questions. Rather, this post is supposed to make you think about what I'm thinking about. :)
[Interesting Aside: In March you should see three articles targeting quantum paradigms of psychopathology being published in the online journal Neuroquantology. Could be interesting...]
Sunday, January 10, 2010
From 'Meaningless' to 'Meaningful'
"A love relationship takes on an added dimension." - yesterday's fortune cookie
"I almost always think things will turn out well, and even when they break I am confident that I can fix them." - Michael Shermer, Scientific American, January 2010.
My life is riddled with coincidences. (They seemed to have increased in frequency as I have moved further into a 5-dimensional mode of being.) However, not all of these coincidences are equally meaningful to me. What determines whether a coincidence is meaningful or not? And if a coincidence is not meaningful, why does it appear? Why should I experience any greater frequency of 'coincidences' than anyone else?
Let's start with the first question, as it's easier to answer. The two quotes above represent two coincidences that I experienced yesterday. (Which one do you think I'm going to attribute more meaning to, and why?) First, it is necessary to establish why these things represent coincidences.
Coincidence: "A striking occurrence of two or more events at one time apparently by mere chance." The primary defining element of a coincidence has to do with time - the proximity of the two events in time. Time is also the most objective element of a coincidence. You and I can agree that these events coincided in time, even though we can disagree as to the explanation of why they coincided and the meaning (if any) of the coincidence.
So let's establish why the Shermer quote is a coincidence. Yesterday, in my head, among other things, I was crafting a follow-up blog post (for a different blog) on Idealism vs. Pragmatism. I had intended to express the conflict that I personally feel between wanting to see/believe the best about a situation (Idealism), and knowing the realistic limits of a situation (Pragmatism). Specifically, I had crafted a sentence about how Idealism can lead you to try to fix what was broken. Yesterday I also took the time to trawl through a collection of low-frequency update internet sites, including the Scientific American site. And, of course, I had to read Shermer's column. This month it's called "Kool-Aid Psychology: Realism versus Optimism", and he leads in with the following "I am, by nature, an optimist. I almost always think things will turn out well, and even when they break I am confident that I can fix them." (My emphasis.)
How meaningful is this coincidence? Not very. I already know that Shermer and I agree on quite a bit more than you'd think. (The major disagreement being, of course, on the reality/nature of ESP/psi and what it represents.) So while the coincidence was enough to make me raise an eyebrow, it's not meaningful enough to cause me to change any of my previously planned actions. And by 'meaningful' I mean that 1) it didn't give me any/enough information that I didn't already have, 2) it didn't cause me to give additional thought to any aspect of a situation, and 3) it didn't resolve any underlying uncertainty that I had about anything.
Now the fortune cookie... Yes, I read the fortunes in fortune cookies. I eat Chinese food about twice a month, if that, so I don't read a lot of fortune cookies, but I do enjoy the fortune as an opportunity for unexpected information or insight to present itself. And when my fortune cookie mentions "an added dimension," and in light of the specific situation I was thinking about at the time...
That's the kind of coincidence that's just loaded with meaning. Yes, the meaningfulness of that coincidence is entirely subjective - that is, it's entirely specific to me. No, I don't interpret it as anything other than the workings of my mind reflected back to me via the selection of a highly-improbable outcome. Like the man said, "The cookie is in no position to know that." It's not a magical cookie, and it's not any kind of supernatural communication from the Beyond. It's just my mind, working things out: talking to itself, if you will.
People have called this type of thing 'communication with your Higher Self'. I prefer to think of it as a type of calculation that the mind is able to engage in - drawing information from the past and the future, condensing it, and reflecting it back via the process of outcome selection. This presumes, of course, that the mind/consciousness has an influence on the process of outcome selection, but then that is the premise of these blogs. It also presumes that information from the future can influence this process.
The process of blogging this idea has, itself, been riddled with coincidences. Books, articles, songs and images would present themselves at just the right moment in time to be used to convey a critical concept or idea. Often I was not even aware of their full impact/meaning until after I had posted. I attribute this to nothing more 'mystical' than being willing and able to access information from the future and trust the answer that showed up, usually in the form of an improbable coincidence. I realize that this sounds highly 'mystical' to a great many of you, and that it bespeaks a much different picture of reality than materialism presents, but it's a non-supernatural picture of reality nonetheless.
Of course the test of this picture of reality is in the practical consequences of accepting it. So sayeth my inner pragmatist. And the aforementioned consequences are still under investigation...
"I almost always think things will turn out well, and even when they break I am confident that I can fix them." - Michael Shermer, Scientific American, January 2010.
My life is riddled with coincidences. (They seemed to have increased in frequency as I have moved further into a 5-dimensional mode of being.) However, not all of these coincidences are equally meaningful to me. What determines whether a coincidence is meaningful or not? And if a coincidence is not meaningful, why does it appear? Why should I experience any greater frequency of 'coincidences' than anyone else?
Let's start with the first question, as it's easier to answer. The two quotes above represent two coincidences that I experienced yesterday. (Which one do you think I'm going to attribute more meaning to, and why?) First, it is necessary to establish why these things represent coincidences.
Coincidence: "A striking occurrence of two or more events at one time apparently by mere chance." The primary defining element of a coincidence has to do with time - the proximity of the two events in time. Time is also the most objective element of a coincidence. You and I can agree that these events coincided in time, even though we can disagree as to the explanation of why they coincided and the meaning (if any) of the coincidence.
So let's establish why the Shermer quote is a coincidence. Yesterday, in my head, among other things, I was crafting a follow-up blog post (for a different blog) on Idealism vs. Pragmatism. I had intended to express the conflict that I personally feel between wanting to see/believe the best about a situation (Idealism), and knowing the realistic limits of a situation (Pragmatism). Specifically, I had crafted a sentence about how Idealism can lead you to try to fix what was broken. Yesterday I also took the time to trawl through a collection of low-frequency update internet sites, including the Scientific American site. And, of course, I had to read Shermer's column. This month it's called "Kool-Aid Psychology: Realism versus Optimism", and he leads in with the following "I am, by nature, an optimist. I almost always think things will turn out well, and even when they break I am confident that I can fix them." (My emphasis.)
How meaningful is this coincidence? Not very. I already know that Shermer and I agree on quite a bit more than you'd think. (The major disagreement being, of course, on the reality/nature of ESP/psi and what it represents.) So while the coincidence was enough to make me raise an eyebrow, it's not meaningful enough to cause me to change any of my previously planned actions. And by 'meaningful' I mean that 1) it didn't give me any/enough information that I didn't already have, 2) it didn't cause me to give additional thought to any aspect of a situation, and 3) it didn't resolve any underlying uncertainty that I had about anything.
Now the fortune cookie... Yes, I read the fortunes in fortune cookies. I eat Chinese food about twice a month, if that, so I don't read a lot of fortune cookies, but I do enjoy the fortune as an opportunity for unexpected information or insight to present itself. And when my fortune cookie mentions "an added dimension," and in light of the specific situation I was thinking about at the time...
That's the kind of coincidence that's just loaded with meaning. Yes, the meaningfulness of that coincidence is entirely subjective - that is, it's entirely specific to me. No, I don't interpret it as anything other than the workings of my mind reflected back to me via the selection of a highly-improbable outcome. Like the man said, "The cookie is in no position to know that." It's not a magical cookie, and it's not any kind of supernatural communication from the Beyond. It's just my mind, working things out: talking to itself, if you will.
People have called this type of thing 'communication with your Higher Self'. I prefer to think of it as a type of calculation that the mind is able to engage in - drawing information from the past and the future, condensing it, and reflecting it back via the process of outcome selection. This presumes, of course, that the mind/consciousness has an influence on the process of outcome selection, but then that is the premise of these blogs. It also presumes that information from the future can influence this process.
The process of blogging this idea has, itself, been riddled with coincidences. Books, articles, songs and images would present themselves at just the right moment in time to be used to convey a critical concept or idea. Often I was not even aware of their full impact/meaning until after I had posted. I attribute this to nothing more 'mystical' than being willing and able to access information from the future and trust the answer that showed up, usually in the form of an improbable coincidence. I realize that this sounds highly 'mystical' to a great many of you, and that it bespeaks a much different picture of reality than materialism presents, but it's a non-supernatural picture of reality nonetheless.
Of course the test of this picture of reality is in the practical consequences of accepting it. So sayeth my inner pragmatist. And the aforementioned consequences are still under investigation...
Friday, November 13, 2009
Time Looks Like... The String Section
"The imagination must be allowed to express itself freely, otherwise it will die."
Nice! And challenging to answer.
I can try to do this with an analogy... I see a moment of conscious experience in much the same way we experience a moment in a symphony. There are many instruments that are playing (or not) at any given moment, and with varying degrees of loudness. And most of us don't stop to parse the whole moment into its component parts.
The violins are almost always playing, and it's fairly easy to detect their influence. To me, they are like the 'past', or the influence of memory upon an individual moment of conscious experience. The violas are much fewer in number relative to the violins, and to me they represent the influence of short-term and working memory - information that is not as firmly anchored as that which resides in long-term memory. Their contribution is generally much harder to detect or parse from the whole. The cellos represent the near-future - that is, the future for which critical events have already been set in motion. Occasionally someone writes a short cello solo, or silences the other instruments to the point where the cello is noticeable. The basses represent the far future. They are generally fewer in number, and their presence in the whole moment is usually more difficult to detect without training.
While each of the four string instruments has a different range of resonance, they all share the property of being a stringed instrument. (I.e., It's all time in some sense - change from one moment to the next.) One could also argue that an individual orchestra (brain/consciousness) can be organized (wired) with a different, though mostly overlapping, set of instruments from any other orchestra. But the strings are still the foundation of any orchestra.
While listening to a symphony, it's possible to momentarily lose track of the whole sound as you choose to isolate and pay attention to the sound of one particular instrument. But all the other sounds are still there. You recognize the sound of a particular instrument because of your previous exposure to that instrument. (I played the cello for four years.) It's easier to isolate and hear/see the influence of that instrument with practice.
In this sense, time to me is like a specific series of notes within a whole moment. Some of the notes may come of the cello, but most of the notes I'm conscious of probably come from the violin. This is quite a subjective, self-absorbed way of looking at time, because I'm parsing the composition of my orchestra, rather than assuming that we are all listening to the same orchestra. So how do I visualize the objective timeline of consensus reality - that thing that moves from the Big Bang through the Middle Ages and into the future?
When I'm thinking in 5 dimensions, I usually don't. I see those events/ideas primarily (though not entirely) as moments in my symphony that reflect influences from my subjective past/future. If an idea or event is something that I have been exposed to many times, then the moment reflects a strong influence from the past (violins). But it may reflect my subjective past in a variety of ways. (Think range of notes, and don't forget that there are other instruments playing as well.)
Sounds like an incredibly self-absorbed perspective, doesn't it? I haven't expanded this analogy to the point where I can explain how I see multiple-observer effects yet. But I'm sure some part of my brain will keep plugging away at it. Thanks - this was fun! :)
Nice! And challenging to answer.
I can try to do this with an analogy... I see a moment of conscious experience in much the same way we experience a moment in a symphony. There are many instruments that are playing (or not) at any given moment, and with varying degrees of loudness. And most of us don't stop to parse the whole moment into its component parts.
The violins are almost always playing, and it's fairly easy to detect their influence. To me, they are like the 'past', or the influence of memory upon an individual moment of conscious experience. The violas are much fewer in number relative to the violins, and to me they represent the influence of short-term and working memory - information that is not as firmly anchored as that which resides in long-term memory. Their contribution is generally much harder to detect or parse from the whole. The cellos represent the near-future - that is, the future for which critical events have already been set in motion. Occasionally someone writes a short cello solo, or silences the other instruments to the point where the cello is noticeable. The basses represent the far future. They are generally fewer in number, and their presence in the whole moment is usually more difficult to detect without training.
While each of the four string instruments has a different range of resonance, they all share the property of being a stringed instrument. (I.e., It's all time in some sense - change from one moment to the next.) One could also argue that an individual orchestra (brain/consciousness) can be organized (wired) with a different, though mostly overlapping, set of instruments from any other orchestra. But the strings are still the foundation of any orchestra.
While listening to a symphony, it's possible to momentarily lose track of the whole sound as you choose to isolate and pay attention to the sound of one particular instrument. But all the other sounds are still there. You recognize the sound of a particular instrument because of your previous exposure to that instrument. (I played the cello for four years.) It's easier to isolate and hear/see the influence of that instrument with practice.
In this sense, time to me is like a specific series of notes within a whole moment. Some of the notes may come of the cello, but most of the notes I'm conscious of probably come from the violin. This is quite a subjective, self-absorbed way of looking at time, because I'm parsing the composition of my orchestra, rather than assuming that we are all listening to the same orchestra. So how do I visualize the objective timeline of consensus reality - that thing that moves from the Big Bang through the Middle Ages and into the future?
When I'm thinking in 5 dimensions, I usually don't. I see those events/ideas primarily (though not entirely) as moments in my symphony that reflect influences from my subjective past/future. If an idea or event is something that I have been exposed to many times, then the moment reflects a strong influence from the past (violins). But it may reflect my subjective past in a variety of ways. (Think range of notes, and don't forget that there are other instruments playing as well.)
Sounds like an incredibly self-absorbed perspective, doesn't it? I haven't expanded this analogy to the point where I can explain how I see multiple-observer effects yet. But I'm sure some part of my brain will keep plugging away at it. Thanks - this was fun! :)
Friday, October 16, 2009
The Nature of Probability
"To throw the dice is to face that which is given by the gods, by powers higher than human. It is to face reality at its most mysterious, like standing unflinching before the thunderstorm."
"Yet the human spirit is restless and nature forever compliant, willing to answer as yet undreamed questions, capable of opening up vast new vistas, revealing still undisclosed parts of her being."
(This one's for the newbie, because I think you are in danger of 'getting it'. ;)
"Probability is a way of expressing knowledge or belief that an event will occur or has occurred...
The word probability does not have a consistent direct definition. In fact, there are two broad categories of probability interpretations, whose adherents possess different (and sometimes conflicting) views about the fundamental nature of probability:
Frequentists talk about probabilities only when dealing with experiments that are random and well-defined. The probability of a random event denotes the relative frequency of occurrence of an experiment's outcome, when repeating the experiment. Frequentists consider probability to be the relative frequency "in the long run" of outcomes.[1]
Bayesians, however, assign probabilities to any statement whatsoever, even when no random process is involved. Probability, for a Bayesian, is a way to represent an individual's degree of belief in a statement, given the evidence." (q)
I would submit that there is a third category of probability interpretation. Like Bayesian probability, it deals with the subjective aspect of knowledge, and it updates as the relative 'force' of a particular piece of knowledge or observation changes in the cognitive space.
But this third category of probability interpretation is entirely concerned with predicting state selection. (By the time I'm done with this post I'll have a catchy name for it.) Not traditional state selection though, which is still presumed to reflect a collapse of the wave function in an objective reality. This third category of probability (subjective state selection probability?) is not concerned with using subjective knowledge to measure the potential for a particular decision or action, but rather with using subjective elements of conscious experience to predict future elements of that same cognitive space. To emphasize how such a definition of probability would be superior to other definitions in predicting outcomes, it becomes necessary to compare them in a common context - hence my emphasis on situations involving 'randomness'.
When faced with a coin flip, classical probability will attempt to predict the outcome of the flip (heads or tails), using only information about any potential bias the coin may have. To be honest, I'm not entirely sure what Bayesians would be attempting to do in this situation. Quantify how they should update their beliefs regarding the bias of the coin?
Those of us using cognitive differential probability will attempt to quantify aspects of our cognition with respect to the as-yet-unobserved outcome in an attempt to predict and/or modify the biases governing the selection of the outcome state. Here's where things get different.
Cognitive differential probability (are we liking that name?) recognizes that different amounts of knowledge about the coin, as well as different attachments to the outcome of the coin flip and other elements of anticipation regarding the outcome of the coin flip, constitute biases in the process of selecting the final state of the flipped coin. Early on in the game I talked about the differences in these knowledge structures. The biases we're talking about change with each additional observation, but they also change in response to various elements of pure cognition. (I know - you either believe it's possible, or you don't.)
I think Bayesian's recognize the constantly-updating weight of subjective beliefs, but I don't think they are using it to predict outcomes in this way. Nor do I think that they model 'beliefs' as comprehensively as I propose to model cognitive space. So where does this leave us?
Once I can figure out how to model degree of overlap in the various elements of cognitive space/representation, modified bi-directionally across time, with suitable boundary conditions to prevent infinite regression yet still accurately predict outcome selection... Once I can do that for a single observer, I'll be back to haunt you. ;)
"Yet the human spirit is restless and nature forever compliant, willing to answer as yet undreamed questions, capable of opening up vast new vistas, revealing still undisclosed parts of her being."
(This one's for the newbie, because I think you are in danger of 'getting it'. ;)
"Probability is a way of expressing knowledge or belief that an event will occur or has occurred...
The word probability does not have a consistent direct definition. In fact, there are two broad categories of probability interpretations, whose adherents possess different (and sometimes conflicting) views about the fundamental nature of probability:
Frequentists talk about probabilities only when dealing with experiments that are random and well-defined. The probability of a random event denotes the relative frequency of occurrence of an experiment's outcome, when repeating the experiment. Frequentists consider probability to be the relative frequency "in the long run" of outcomes.[1]
Bayesians, however, assign probabilities to any statement whatsoever, even when no random process is involved. Probability, for a Bayesian, is a way to represent an individual's degree of belief in a statement, given the evidence." (q)
I would submit that there is a third category of probability interpretation. Like Bayesian probability, it deals with the subjective aspect of knowledge, and it updates as the relative 'force' of a particular piece of knowledge or observation changes in the cognitive space.
But this third category of probability interpretation is entirely concerned with predicting state selection. (By the time I'm done with this post I'll have a catchy name for it.) Not traditional state selection though, which is still presumed to reflect a collapse of the wave function in an objective reality. This third category of probability (subjective state selection probability?) is not concerned with using subjective knowledge to measure the potential for a particular decision or action, but rather with using subjective elements of conscious experience to predict future elements of that same cognitive space. To emphasize how such a definition of probability would be superior to other definitions in predicting outcomes, it becomes necessary to compare them in a common context - hence my emphasis on situations involving 'randomness'.
When faced with a coin flip, classical probability will attempt to predict the outcome of the flip (heads or tails), using only information about any potential bias the coin may have. To be honest, I'm not entirely sure what Bayesians would be attempting to do in this situation. Quantify how they should update their beliefs regarding the bias of the coin?
Those of us using cognitive differential probability will attempt to quantify aspects of our cognition with respect to the as-yet-unobserved outcome in an attempt to predict and/or modify the biases governing the selection of the outcome state. Here's where things get different.
Cognitive differential probability (are we liking that name?) recognizes that different amounts of knowledge about the coin, as well as different attachments to the outcome of the coin flip and other elements of anticipation regarding the outcome of the coin flip, constitute biases in the process of selecting the final state of the flipped coin. Early on in the game I talked about the differences in these knowledge structures. The biases we're talking about change with each additional observation, but they also change in response to various elements of pure cognition. (I know - you either believe it's possible, or you don't.)
I think Bayesian's recognize the constantly-updating weight of subjective beliefs, but I don't think they are using it to predict outcomes in this way. Nor do I think that they model 'beliefs' as comprehensively as I propose to model cognitive space. So where does this leave us?
Once I can figure out how to model degree of overlap in the various elements of cognitive space/representation, modified bi-directionally across time, with suitable boundary conditions to prevent infinite regression yet still accurately predict outcome selection... Once I can do that for a single observer, I'll be back to haunt you. ;)
Sunday, October 11, 2009
I Have A Dream
"But for about 20 years now, a controversial area of scientific research has sought to determine whether a supernatural power, invoked through prayer and working alongside doctors, can cure illness... The research involves intercessory prayer, or people interceding on someone else's behalf..." - Can Prayer Help Heal?, Wisconsin State Journal, October 11, 2009.
I have a dream... that one day we will accept effects like this without resorting to God as a default cause. We will accept that 'prayers' are simply thoughts that anticipate future outcomes in a variety of ways, and we will understand outcome selection as a collective effort. "It's not about us controlling God"... but it is about us controlling the process of state selection.
I have a dream... that one day no one will dream of thinking that 'prayer' can replace modern medicine. I don't think that God is behind these effects, but I also don't think that you have enough control to trust the outcome of someone else's life to your thoughts.
I have a dream... that one day we will study these effects without thinking that the only purpose of such results is to prove or disprove the existence of God. I have a dream... that one day the skeptics will realize that it is neither necessary nor correct to accept randomness as the fundamental state of the universe. A dislike for religious explanations as the alternative to randomness should not push us into prematurely accepting that perceived randomness is not connected to thought.
I have a dream... that one day you will see what is right in front of you. You will understand how patients who have been told that they are being prayed for will develop different expectations about their outcomes. We will understand how to give patients information in a way that maximizes their ability to push themselves towards the outcome that they desire. And we will understand their right to choose whether or not we intercede in how we weave our thoughts around their problem.
I have a dream... that one day statements like this - "I think God and God alone chooses whether you have a miracle." - will be obsolete, not only because we will understand the effects of 'prayer' as something other than the intervention of a divine being, but also because once such things are understood, they will no longer be considered 'miracles'. One day God will no longer be the default explanation for all 'coincidental' or inconvenient occurrences.
I have a dream... that you will one day have the same epiphany that I had while counting bacteria in a microbiology lab. If my thoughts can determine whether I will find these bacteria alive or dead, then this entire endeavor is pointless and there is a "bigger problem" that I should be working on.
I have a dream... that one day we will find a meaning behind such a system, because I don't like the idea that life/conscious experience can be this capricious without a reason.
I have a dream... that someday one of you will want to talk with me about this idea, and together we will be able to expand this research.
I have a dream... that one day we will accept effects like this without resorting to God as a default cause. We will accept that 'prayers' are simply thoughts that anticipate future outcomes in a variety of ways, and we will understand outcome selection as a collective effort. "It's not about us controlling God"... but it is about us controlling the process of state selection.
I have a dream... that one day no one will dream of thinking that 'prayer' can replace modern medicine. I don't think that God is behind these effects, but I also don't think that you have enough control to trust the outcome of someone else's life to your thoughts.
I have a dream... that one day we will study these effects without thinking that the only purpose of such results is to prove or disprove the existence of God. I have a dream... that one day the skeptics will realize that it is neither necessary nor correct to accept randomness as the fundamental state of the universe. A dislike for religious explanations as the alternative to randomness should not push us into prematurely accepting that perceived randomness is not connected to thought.
I have a dream... that one day you will see what is right in front of you. You will understand how patients who have been told that they are being prayed for will develop different expectations about their outcomes. We will understand how to give patients information in a way that maximizes their ability to push themselves towards the outcome that they desire. And we will understand their right to choose whether or not we intercede in how we weave our thoughts around their problem.
I have a dream... that one day statements like this - "I think God and God alone chooses whether you have a miracle." - will be obsolete, not only because we will understand the effects of 'prayer' as something other than the intervention of a divine being, but also because once such things are understood, they will no longer be considered 'miracles'. One day God will no longer be the default explanation for all 'coincidental' or inconvenient occurrences.
I have a dream... that you will one day have the same epiphany that I had while counting bacteria in a microbiology lab. If my thoughts can determine whether I will find these bacteria alive or dead, then this entire endeavor is pointless and there is a "bigger problem" that I should be working on.
I have a dream... that one day we will find a meaning behind such a system, because I don't like the idea that life/conscious experience can be this capricious without a reason.
I have a dream... that someday one of you will want to talk with me about this idea, and together we will be able to expand this research.
Saturday, October 3, 2009
Measuring the Immeasurable
"Essential science and common sense keep coming back to data, fact and observation."
The fact that I can't lay my hands on this paper immediately now offends my hacker sensibilities. Grrr. (That paper would be Radin, D, & Atwater, F.H., Exploratory Evidence for Correlations Between Entrained Mental Coherence and Random Physical Systems, Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol 23 (3), 2009, for the google search engines. ;)
And yet because I can't lay my hand on it, I can speculate about what the author actually did. (This is a fun game that all grad students should learn to play. Read only the abstract and flesh out what you think the paper should contain. Then go back and compare your notes to the actual paper. Worship anyone who exceeds your expectations.)
I'm temporarily suppressing my 'goody, goody gumdrops!' reaction to the topic in favor of my more prosaic 'please tell me you're going to discuss competing explanations of the phenomenon' reaction. If I were really, really in a good universe, the data collection and distribution processes would have been designed with various competing ideas about Observer Theories and multiple-observer dynamics in mind. (Yours truly is really looking forward to the day when we can stop 'proving' that there is an effect, and focus on using experimental data to tear apart competing theories.)
So here are the questions and ideas that came to mind when I read this abstract/blogpost.
Who were the subjects?
In an ideal study, they would be trained meditators who had been evaluated and matched on self-assessed descriptions of their meditative experiences, and various psychological parameters such as absorption. This helps ensure that any effects obtained are not the result of a single 'strongest' observer. Ideally such subjects could also be pretested to determine their individual ability to affect an RNG in the desired state of consciousness.
Depending on the nature of the research questions being asked, the groups of subjects would also vary in size, to attempt to correlate magnitude of effect with number of 'coherent' observers. The magnitude of effect achieved by trained meditators might also be compared to that achieved by untrained subjects with similar psychological parameters. (Previous studies suggests a straightforward prediction of 'more coherent observers = greater deviation from pure randomness'.)
What was done to eliminate/minimize an experimenter effect?
Let me try to be as clear as possible while not writing a separate treatise on the topic. At some point it's going to become necessary to establish that any observed deviation from randomness is not due to a time-displaced effect generated by the one observer who views all the critical data in a form most-suited for discriminating between outcome options - the experimenter. This is a minor point if you are trying to prove that there is an effect, but a relatively major one if you are trying to establish the source of the effect. (Click here for a discussion on taking the next step with observer theories. Awesome reference list for those who scroll all the way to the bottom of that page.)
Similar arguments could be made for various other ways of appropriately isolating the results/observations, but this can quickly get out of hand. It'll probably only be useful when the task is no longer to 'prove' the effect, but to model the data according to a specific theory/set of theories.
What does this mean - "An exploratory hypothesis predicted that fluctuations in entrained mental coherence associated with the workshop activities would modulate the random data recorded during the workshops." ? (My emphasis.)
I'm not that familiar with binaural-beat rhythms or the specific effects that they have on consciousness/brain waves/neurochemicals/etc. (Note to self: Read that paper.) I suspect that the author is using 'fluctuations' to refer to the difference between the 'coherent' and the (presumably) noncoherent times during the trial period, rather than to differences within the period of exposure to the binaural-beat rhythms itself. Although now I'm beginning to wonder how precisely the latter could be modelled...
What justifies this time frame? "Coherence was entrained by having groups listen to a prescribed series of binaural-beat rhythms during a 6-day workshop." (My emphasis, again.)
Is it necessary to use 6 days of data because the subjects were unfamiliar with the technique prior to the workshop? Was the same amount of data collected on all six days? If so, are there any differences in the data from 'coherent' periods in days 1 and 2, and the same periods in days 5 and 6?
"Random data were continually collected from these RNGs during 14 workshops." That's 84 days of data for each of 3 RNGs, and another 56 days of data for the control period. (Respectful pause for the enormity of the data set.) Now I wonder how robust any individual set of data would have been...
I'm beginning to suspect that this experiment took advantage of an existing program in order to collect data. Therefore, all the parameters that one might like to control or manipulate were not necessarily available for such control. (I could be wrong. You should, of course, read the actual paper.)
What, exactly, is being correlated, and why? "This was predicted to result in positive correlations between random data streams collected from one workshop to the next."
It sounds like data streams from the 'coherent' periods were correlated to each other, across workshops...
Now, I'm no expert on analyzing enormous sets of random numbers. I couldn't give you the algorithm for determining that one set of numbers is less 'random' than another, although it might be fun to see if I could derive one. But it seems like there is only one thing to compare...
So, is the degree of randomness being compared? And if so, why isn't the degree of randomness in the set of numbers from the 'coherent' period being compared to the degree of randomness in the set of numbers from the control period? I understand comparing data within device, within group, and within workshop. And I understand comparing 'coherent' periods to control periods. What I don't understand is what could be compared across workshop but within 'coherent' data? Especially if subjects were not matched on any critical parameters.
From the next sentence - "Results showed that during the workshops the overall correlation was positive, as predicted (p = .008); during control periods the same RNGs produced chance results (p = .74). " - it sounds like the correlation was between the time period (coherent/noncoherent) and the degree of randomness. Presumably, a lower degree of randomness was seen in the data during the 'coherent' times than was seen during the noncoherent times. (Now I also want to know the raw magnitude of the difference in degree of randomness.)
So what, if anything, was compared across workshop but within 'coherent' periods? Direction of deviation from random center point? Magnitude of deviation from randomness? Temporal location of deviations from randomness relative to 'coherence' activity?
I are confused. Even the espresso-laced truffles aren't enough to break the mental deadlock on this. If this becomes clearer to me at any point, I'll post an update.
[Aside: If you are a certain author of this paper, that was probably more than you ever wanted to hear from any single reader. Consider it payback for taunting me with the paper but not giving me the actual paper. ;) ]
Update 10/29/09 : I finally got my hack on and scored a copy of this article. (It's been a busy few weeks.) I didn't realize the extent to which this study would emphasize the "felt sense when individual thoughts and actions seem to merge into a single group thought or action." I can't speculate as to why the individuals' "subjective shift" towards the "same wavelength" might be an important element in the success of a collective effort to affect 'randomness'. Nor am I entirely sure why this cohesiveness is necessary, or qualitatively different than all participants simply focusing on the same outcome. According to the Global Consciousness Project, the simultaneous focused attention of large groups can produce similar effects. (And the thought of a "group mind" scares me a little bit.)
As anticipated, the subjects were participants in a workshop designed for other purposes.
As for my botched attempt to understand the data analysis... I had an entirely different picture of what the data stream from the RNGs would look like. In actuality, the data stream consisted on 0s and 1s. The authors predicted that these data streams "should have been modulated by mind in approximately the same way." This could mean one of two things - either the actual values produced by each RNG were the same (all 0s), or the change from one data point to the next was equally present (or not) in each data stream. (Ex: With starting values of 0,0,1, the next set of bits are 1,1,0. Each bit changed from its previous value.) At this point my understanding of the data analysis breaks down. Again. I understand the math, but not the rationale for choosing this method. I refer you to the original paper. Again.
There is one other issue that puzzles me - the belief of the authors that the physical proximity of the RNG machines to the subjects was somehow important to the results. "Data generated by the same RNGs run at distant locations... did not" show the same correlations that were evident in the close-proximity RNGs. In fact, from my perspective, there is no reason to expect such a difference, unless the information, feedback, or expectations were different between the close and the distant RNGs.
Though no attempt at discrimination was made between theories about the effects, the author did acknowledge the potential for experimenter effects. Given the authors' access to the data and expectations about the data, especially relative to those of the subjects (who were largely ignorant of the RNGs and the data that was being collected), I would argue that perhaps a good portion, if not all of the effect, was an experimenter effect. The fact that RNGs were placed at a distance for the test site, as well as in close proximity to the subjects, indicates that one or more of the authors may have had expectations of seeing a difference in the data based on physical distance. At this point, the test is to see if the experimenter can replicate the experiment but produce data that indicates positive correlations in the distant RNGs as well as the close RNGs, by will alone.
Tricky business, but I have a sneaking suspicion that a better understand of these effects will only come if we are much more precise in identifying who has the most information about the experiment, and his/her motivations and expectations for the experiment/outcome. (Yeah, I'm still looking for that poster I promised you earlier. ) For all we know at this point, my observation of this paper had a significant effect on the outcome. We would test that idea by providing the data/results to all interested parties simultaneously, and then destroying them to prevent future observations that might influence the outcome. This is the antithesis of academic publishing, but it's critical for testing/eliminating certain elements of 'retroactive-PK'.
If you haven't quit reading this post yet, then extra points for you, but really - what's wrong with you?! ;)
The fact that I can't lay my hands on this paper immediately now offends my hacker sensibilities. Grrr. (That paper would be Radin, D, & Atwater, F.H., Exploratory Evidence for Correlations Between Entrained Mental Coherence and Random Physical Systems, Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol 23 (3), 2009, for the google search engines. ;)
And yet because I can't lay my hand on it, I can speculate about what the author actually did. (This is a fun game that all grad students should learn to play. Read only the abstract and flesh out what you think the paper should contain. Then go back and compare your notes to the actual paper. Worship anyone who exceeds your expectations.)
I'm temporarily suppressing my 'goody, goody gumdrops!' reaction to the topic in favor of my more prosaic 'please tell me you're going to discuss competing explanations of the phenomenon' reaction. If I were really, really in a good universe, the data collection and distribution processes would have been designed with various competing ideas about Observer Theories and multiple-observer dynamics in mind. (Yours truly is really looking forward to the day when we can stop 'proving' that there is an effect, and focus on using experimental data to tear apart competing theories.)
So here are the questions and ideas that came to mind when I read this abstract/blogpost.
Who were the subjects?
In an ideal study, they would be trained meditators who had been evaluated and matched on self-assessed descriptions of their meditative experiences, and various psychological parameters such as absorption. This helps ensure that any effects obtained are not the result of a single 'strongest' observer. Ideally such subjects could also be pretested to determine their individual ability to affect an RNG in the desired state of consciousness.
Depending on the nature of the research questions being asked, the groups of subjects would also vary in size, to attempt to correlate magnitude of effect with number of 'coherent' observers. The magnitude of effect achieved by trained meditators might also be compared to that achieved by untrained subjects with similar psychological parameters. (Previous studies suggests a straightforward prediction of 'more coherent observers = greater deviation from pure randomness'.)
What was done to eliminate/minimize an experimenter effect?
Let me try to be as clear as possible while not writing a separate treatise on the topic. At some point it's going to become necessary to establish that any observed deviation from randomness is not due to a time-displaced effect generated by the one observer who views all the critical data in a form most-suited for discriminating between outcome options - the experimenter. This is a minor point if you are trying to prove that there is an effect, but a relatively major one if you are trying to establish the source of the effect. (Click here for a discussion on taking the next step with observer theories. Awesome reference list for those who scroll all the way to the bottom of that page.)
Similar arguments could be made for various other ways of appropriately isolating the results/observations, but this can quickly get out of hand. It'll probably only be useful when the task is no longer to 'prove' the effect, but to model the data according to a specific theory/set of theories.
What does this mean - "An exploratory hypothesis predicted that fluctuations in entrained mental coherence associated with the workshop activities would modulate the random data recorded during the workshops." ? (My emphasis.)
I'm not that familiar with binaural-beat rhythms or the specific effects that they have on consciousness/brain waves/neurochemicals/etc. (Note to self: Read that paper.) I suspect that the author is using 'fluctuations' to refer to the difference between the 'coherent' and the (presumably) noncoherent times during the trial period, rather than to differences within the period of exposure to the binaural-beat rhythms itself. Although now I'm beginning to wonder how precisely the latter could be modelled...
What justifies this time frame? "Coherence was entrained by having groups listen to a prescribed series of binaural-beat rhythms during a 6-day workshop." (My emphasis, again.)
Is it necessary to use 6 days of data because the subjects were unfamiliar with the technique prior to the workshop? Was the same amount of data collected on all six days? If so, are there any differences in the data from 'coherent' periods in days 1 and 2, and the same periods in days 5 and 6?
"Random data were continually collected from these RNGs during 14 workshops." That's 84 days of data for each of 3 RNGs, and another 56 days of data for the control period. (Respectful pause for the enormity of the data set.) Now I wonder how robust any individual set of data would have been...
I'm beginning to suspect that this experiment took advantage of an existing program in order to collect data. Therefore, all the parameters that one might like to control or manipulate were not necessarily available for such control. (I could be wrong. You should, of course, read the actual paper.)
What, exactly, is being correlated, and why? "This was predicted to result in positive correlations between random data streams collected from one workshop to the next."
It sounds like data streams from the 'coherent' periods were correlated to each other, across workshops...
Now, I'm no expert on analyzing enormous sets of random numbers. I couldn't give you the algorithm for determining that one set of numbers is less 'random' than another, although it might be fun to see if I could derive one. But it seems like there is only one thing to compare...
So, is the degree of randomness being compared? And if so, why isn't the degree of randomness in the set of numbers from the 'coherent' period being compared to the degree of randomness in the set of numbers from the control period? I understand comparing data within device, within group, and within workshop. And I understand comparing 'coherent' periods to control periods. What I don't understand is what could be compared across workshop but within 'coherent' data? Especially if subjects were not matched on any critical parameters.
From the next sentence - "Results showed that during the workshops the overall correlation was positive, as predicted (p = .008); during control periods the same RNGs produced chance results (p = .74). " - it sounds like the correlation was between the time period (coherent/noncoherent) and the degree of randomness. Presumably, a lower degree of randomness was seen in the data during the 'coherent' times than was seen during the noncoherent times. (Now I also want to know the raw magnitude of the difference in degree of randomness.)
So what, if anything, was compared across workshop but within 'coherent' periods? Direction of deviation from random center point? Magnitude of deviation from randomness? Temporal location of deviations from randomness relative to 'coherence' activity?
I are confused. Even the espresso-laced truffles aren't enough to break the mental deadlock on this. If this becomes clearer to me at any point, I'll post an update.
[Aside: If you are a certain author of this paper, that was probably more than you ever wanted to hear from any single reader. Consider it payback for taunting me with the paper but not giving me the actual paper. ;) ]
Update 10/29/09 : I finally got my hack on and scored a copy of this article. (It's been a busy few weeks.) I didn't realize the extent to which this study would emphasize the "felt sense when individual thoughts and actions seem to merge into a single group thought or action." I can't speculate as to why the individuals' "subjective shift" towards the "same wavelength" might be an important element in the success of a collective effort to affect 'randomness'. Nor am I entirely sure why this cohesiveness is necessary, or qualitatively different than all participants simply focusing on the same outcome. According to the Global Consciousness Project, the simultaneous focused attention of large groups can produce similar effects. (And the thought of a "group mind" scares me a little bit.)
As anticipated, the subjects were participants in a workshop designed for other purposes.
As for my botched attempt to understand the data analysis... I had an entirely different picture of what the data stream from the RNGs would look like. In actuality, the data stream consisted on 0s and 1s. The authors predicted that these data streams "should have been modulated by mind in approximately the same way." This could mean one of two things - either the actual values produced by each RNG were the same (all 0s), or the change from one data point to the next was equally present (or not) in each data stream. (Ex: With starting values of 0,0,1, the next set of bits are 1,1,0. Each bit changed from its previous value.) At this point my understanding of the data analysis breaks down. Again. I understand the math, but not the rationale for choosing this method. I refer you to the original paper. Again.
There is one other issue that puzzles me - the belief of the authors that the physical proximity of the RNG machines to the subjects was somehow important to the results. "Data generated by the same RNGs run at distant locations... did not" show the same correlations that were evident in the close-proximity RNGs. In fact, from my perspective, there is no reason to expect such a difference, unless the information, feedback, or expectations were different between the close and the distant RNGs.
Though no attempt at discrimination was made between theories about the effects, the author did acknowledge the potential for experimenter effects. Given the authors' access to the data and expectations about the data, especially relative to those of the subjects (who were largely ignorant of the RNGs and the data that was being collected), I would argue that perhaps a good portion, if not all of the effect, was an experimenter effect. The fact that RNGs were placed at a distance for the test site, as well as in close proximity to the subjects, indicates that one or more of the authors may have had expectations of seeing a difference in the data based on physical distance. At this point, the test is to see if the experimenter can replicate the experiment but produce data that indicates positive correlations in the distant RNGs as well as the close RNGs, by will alone.
Tricky business, but I have a sneaking suspicion that a better understand of these effects will only come if we are much more precise in identifying who has the most information about the experiment, and his/her motivations and expectations for the experiment/outcome. (Yeah, I'm still looking for that poster I promised you earlier. ) For all we know at this point, my observation of this paper had a significant effect on the outcome. We would test that idea by providing the data/results to all interested parties simultaneously, and then destroying them to prevent future observations that might influence the outcome. This is the antithesis of academic publishing, but it's critical for testing/eliminating certain elements of 'retroactive-PK'.
If you haven't quit reading this post yet, then extra points for you, but really - what's wrong with you?! ;)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
